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WHAT’S BENEATH THE GRAHAM 
CRACKER?:  
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW ON  
THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORM  
AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
 
David A. Shapiro* 
 
“There can only be a few issues where government policies in countries 
like Libya and Burma appear more progressive than those in the 
United States.  Juvenile sentencing is one of them.”1 
 
“But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national 
consensus’ must go to [the majority’s] appeal . . . to the views of . . . 
members of the so-called ‘world community’ . . . whose notions of justice 
are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”2 
INTRODUCTION  
In the United States, juvenile sentencing reformers find 
themselves battling parties espousing varied and conflicting 
interests.  American juvenile sentencing practices are the 
harshest in the world, despite the fact that the United States 
once was the global leader in juvenile justice reform.3  Nations 
spanning the six inhabited continents modeled their 
                                                          
* A.B., Washington University in St. Louis (2009); J.D., Brooklyn Law 
School (2012).  Incoming Gault Fellow at the National Juvenile Defender 
Center (2012–2014).  I would like to thank Professor William D. Araiza for 
his thoughtful edits and support throughout law school, Professor Cynthia 
Godsoe for her guidance, Mark Soler, and Jason Szyani at the Center for 
Children’s Law & Policy, Amy Conroy, my sister Deborah, my parents, and 
my friends and colleagues from college, law school, and the wide world of 
juvenile justice. 
1 Ari Paul, America’s Imprisoned Kids, AM. PROSPECT (May 10, 2007), 
http://prospect.org/article/americas-imprisoned-kids.   
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3 See Barry Krisberg, Rediscovering the Juvenile Justice Ideal in the 
United States, in COMPARATIVE YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES 6–7 (John 
Muncie & Barry Goldson eds., 2006) [hereinafter CRITICAL ISSUES]. 
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enlightened, compassionate juvenile justice systems on our 
own.4  Today, however, the roles are reversed.  It appears that 
it is the fifty states that have much to learn from juvenile 
justice reforms overseas.   
This article examines the Supreme Court’s application of 
international law in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and 
argues that reformers should look beyond the Court’s analysis 
and use comparative law to obtain their goals of juvenile 
sentencing and policy reform.  In 2010, the United States 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to declare unconstitutional 
the sentence of life without the opportunity of parole for crimes 
committed by minors (also known as juvenile life without 
parole, or “JLWOP”).5  Such a decision would have remedied a 
discrepancy that sets the United States apart from virtually all 
other nations.6  Instead, in Graham v. Florida, the Court 
tiptoed around the issue,7 holding that JLWOP violated the 
Eighth Amendment only when imposed for non-homicide 
crimes and that while “a state need not guarantee the offender 
eventual release . . . it must provide . . . some realistic 
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”8   
The holding in Graham left many questions unanswered:  
What constitutes a “realistic opportunity to obtain release?”9  
What if our “standards of decency”—the relatively fluid 
standard used to measure the constitutionality of state 
punishment—evolve more within the next few years?10  Will 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), CTR. FOR CHILD. L. & 
POL’Y, http://www.cclp.org/jlwop.php (last visited Jan.15, 2012). 
6 See Juvenile Life Without Parole, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., http://www. 
youthlaw.org/juvenile_justice/6/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
7 To be fair, some scholars consider the Graham decision to be a giant 
leap in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, marking “the first time the Court 
ever applied its more searching ‘categorical’ Eighth Amendment analysis—
heretofore reserved solely for capital sentences—to a term of years sentence.”  
Scott Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP): An Antidote to 
Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 408, 410 (2011).  
8 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
9 See Lloyd Dunkelberger, Juvenile Offenders Still Get Near-Life Terms, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 21, 2010, available at http://www.herald 
tribune.com/article/20101121/ARTICLE/11211086 (wondering the same).  
10 “Standards of decency have evolved since 1980. They will never stop 
doing so.”  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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Graham soon be extended to homicide offenses?11 Those 
questions I leave for others.12  
Rather, this article argues that scholars ought to explore 
the views that Justice Scalia rejected out-of-hand in his 
dissent—that the Supreme Court “should cease putting forth 
foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its 
decisions.”13  Indeed, advocates ought not wait for the next 
Supreme Court decision to argue for reforms.  They can use 
Scalia’s reasoned bases relative to the far more progressive 
juvenile justice policies of other nations to pursue change 
domestically through state and local legislatures.   
This tactic is necessary for two reasons. First, 
conservatives on the Supreme Court will continue to rail 
against the use—even the mere consideration—of international 
law, rendering the Court’s liberals, allied with Justice 
                                                          
11 Clearly, the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile jurisprudence 
continues to surprise scholars.  In 2010, Jeffrey Fagan argued that “the best 
way to understand Graham is to see it as results-oriented.  The Court denied 
juvenile LWOP to non-murderers so that it could save mandatory LWOP for 
capital crimes and other murders.”  Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Delayed?, 
NAT’L L.J., June 14, 2010, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/11 
875.htm. Following Roper, Fagan continued, “the Court would have risked a 
crisis of legitimacy if it went the next step and banned the second-harshest 
punishment, no matter how logical that extension might be.” Id. On March 
20, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on two cases related to the 
imposition of JLWOP for homicide crimes, but will most likely limit its 
holding to young teens.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jackson v. Arkansas, 
2011 WL 5322575 (No. 10-9647); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v. 
Alabama, 2011 WL 5322568 (No. 10-9646).   
12 Scholars have already started to answer them.  See, e.g., Alice 
Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 
(2010) (commenting on whether Graham provides any hope at all for 
sentencing reform); Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment 
for Persons Under the Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America. 
What Next?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 393, 400 (2005) (arguing that the Roper 
decision should apply to all JLWOP); Elizabeth Cepparulo, Note, Roper v. 
Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life Really Better than Death?, 16 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2007) (arguing that the Roper decision 
should apply to all JLWOP).  Some commentaries appear to be more like 
stabs in the dark.  See generally Richard S. Frase, Graham's Good News—
and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010) (arguing that Graham will most likely 
not be applied beyond its present context of juvenile non-homicide offenses); 
Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 
FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2010) (arguing that there may not be much progress).   
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Kennedy, far too timid to explicitly harness foreign law to effect 
change.14  Because federal decisions have been so tentative in 
their embrace of international standards,15 state legislatures, 
rather than the federal courts, ought to be the focal point of 
juvenile justice reform for advocates seeking to highlight both 
the progress made and standards developed abroad.  Second, 
the best policy choices can only come about after comparing 
and considering the best ideas.  Using international ideas at 
the state and local levels will maximize the amount of reform-
oriented action and thus promote the change advocates seek. 
This article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses how 
the United States Supreme Court has used international law in 
its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing in particular on 
how its decisions have in some instances relied upon, and in 
other instances repudiated, international law.16  Even where 
the justices incorporated international law into judicial 
decision-making, the current treatment of international 
sources fails to provide the nuanced approach necessary to 
produce compelling change in the field of juvenile justice 
reform.  
Part II posits that reformers’ efforts are misplaced when 
they emphasize international law as a rationale to encourage 
this country’s federal courts to increase leniency on juvenile 
offenders.  Specifically, I argue that the current focus relies too 
heavily on international treaties that the United States has not 
even ratified, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), and on broad generalizations 
regarding the practices of the Western world as a whole.  This 
focus is improper not only because the sources lack nuance, but 
because international law does not just lead—it follows.  
International legal norms do not just set standards—they are 
derived from pre-existing policies and laws.  We ought to look 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Jim Kelly, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Limits on its Use of 
International Law, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WATCH (May 19, 2010), http://www. 
globalgovernancewatch.org/spotlight_on_sovereignty/us-supreme-court-clarif 
ies-limits-on-its-use-of-international-law. 
15 See id. 
16 See generally James I. Pearce, Note: International Materials and the 
Eighth Amendment: Some Thoughts on Method, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
235 (2010) (explaining that the Court wasted opportunities in both Roper and 
Graham to clarify the methodology by which the majorities incorporated 
international opinion into their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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to the rationales behind the laws and policies of individual 
countries, rather than countries as groups, viewing the CRC as 
a compromise, rather than as the gold standard.  This new 
framework emphasizes a dynamic, comparative approach to 
juvenile rights reform in America over a consensus-based 
international law paradigm that has, so far, been the go-to 
standard for advocates.    
In Part III, using the framework I have established, I 
argue that advocacy emphasizing reforms and policies of 
individual nations directed towards state legislatures is the 
best way to reform juvenile sentencing.  By evaluating the 
rationales that various nations have put forth to justify their 
more flexible approaches to juvenile sentencing, reformers here 
can change not only sentencing, but also the whole arena of 
juvenile justice.  I examine decisions of foreign courts and the 
policy choices of legislatures internationally.  By learning from 
the trial and error of other sovereign nations,17 we can reform 
juvenile sentencing nationwide, well beyond the timid limits 
that the Supreme Court established in Graham.18  Ultimately, 
I believe this more nuanced approach is illustrative of how far 
juvenile sentencing reform can and should go in the United 
States.19   
 
                                                          
17 “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting).  See also A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and 
Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 630 (1999) (writing, about the 
context of ideas for internet governance, “[o]ther forms of regulatory 
arbitrage suit U.S. interests . . . given our federal system, however, it seems a 
little odd to find . . . that the contribution of nations as ‘big labs of democracy’ 
is not recognized.”) (emphasis added). 
18 And that may or may not change in the near future, as it looks beyond 
Graham’s implications, most likely to juveniles who have committed 
homicide. 
19 This article does not address how the Supreme Court has used 
international law in weighing due process protections for juveniles. Because 
the juveniles facing JLWOP have been transferred to adult court, Eighth 
Amendment, rather than Fourteenth Amendment standards apply to the 
sentences given.  See Mark Soler, Dana Schoenberg & Marc Schindler, 
Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 
483, 508 (2009). 
5
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I. THE CAUTIOUS AMBIGUITY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Supreme Court and International Law within an Eighth 
Amendment Framework 
Today, in determining whether a sentence violates the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,20 the 
Supreme Court looks to what it has termed the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”21  To negotiate22 the current evolving standard, the 
Justices first use “objective indicia of consensus.”23  These 
include the sentencing policies of state legislatures24 and actual 
sentencing practices.25  Then the Court applies its “own 
independent judgment” to determine violations of 
constitutionality.26   
Advocates have struggled to find a place for international 
law within this muddled framework.27  The “own independent 
judgment” prong is vague and seems to grant the Justices 
much leeway to hold a sentence cruel and unusual.  On one 
hand, this prong implicates international norms because, in 
                                                          
20 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
21 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
22 I use this term because some scholars believe that the Court does not 
actually apply the “evolving standards” test.  See John F. Stinneford, 
Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 87 
(Oct. 2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court is at least tacitly leaving the 
“evolving standards of decency test behind”). 
23 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
24 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
25 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831–32 (1988) (plurality 
opinion). 
26 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
27 Amnesty International argues that international “standards also 
provide an important indicator of evolving standards of decency, which in 
turn illuminate the contours of acceptable conduct under the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Brief for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Support 
of Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-
7621) [hereinafter Brief for Amnesty International]; see also James I. Pearce, 
Note: International Materials and the Eighth Amendment: Some Thoughts on 
Method, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (2010) (noting that one could fit 
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today’s burgeoning, fast-globalizing marketplace of ideas, the 
Justices’ opinions are at least subtly informed by laws and 
norms of other nations.28  Indeed, David Nelkin posits: “[in] a 
globalizing world, legal systems find their place in a field of 
‘inter-cultural legality’ whereby other models (or better, models 
of models) serve as cultural resources for development of our 
own system through processes of imposition, imitation or 
rejection.”29   
Unfortunately, pressure from conservatives prevents the 
Justices from placing real meaning in the sentencing laws of 
other nations, or at least prevents them from being honest in 
their use of international law.30  Instead, Justices refuse to 
admit the persuasive power contained in international law, 
even when there is no reason to cite to it other than for its 
persuasion.  Thus, juvenile justice advocates tackling 
sentencing reform should first address what I call “the honesty 
problem.”  
B. The Supreme Court’s Use of International Law & The 
Honesty Problem 
1. Introduction 
Throughout its jurisprudence, the United States Supreme 
Court has refused to quantify anything approaching the exact 
value or even significance of international law.31  I call this “the 
                                                          
28 See David Sloss, Do International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 181 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Roper 
opinion did not admit to its true rationale for finding capital punishment for 
juveniles unconstitutional and that, in fact, an honest reading of Roper 
necessitates a reliance on international law); cf. Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie 
West, The Decline of the Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence of 
Evolving Norms, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427, 495 (2005) (arguing that 
since the Court had considered the constitutionality of the juvenile death 
penalty in 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky, that societal norms had evolved 
“opposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders”). 
29 David Nelken, Italy: A Lesson in Tolerance?, in CRITICAL ISSUES, supra 
note 3, at 148. [ approved] 
30 For pressure from outside the Court, see, e.g., Steven Groves, 
Questions for Judge Sotomayor on the Use of Foreign and International Law, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 6, 2009), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/ 
pdf/wm25 25.pdf (arguing that Sotomayor might attempt to “impos[e] foreign 
norms and practices through judicial fiat”). 
31 See infra notes 33–38. 
7
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honesty problem.”  In cases prior to Graham, the Court 
“recognized,”32 “noted,” and “observed”33 international law, 
deeming it “not irrelevant.”34  International law provided 
“confirmation,”35 but has not been “controlling”36 in 
determining the validity of opinions.  The Graham majority 
expressly recognized that international law played a role in its 
decision, helping to define cruel and unusual punishment for 
the seventh time since 1958.37  Still, even the most progressive 
Justices have described foreign law in ambiguous, cursory, and 
conservative ways. 
In 1958, in the landmark case of Trop v. Dulles, a plurality 
of the Supreme Court of the United States held as 
unconstitutional the punishment of the revocation of 
citizenship,38 noting that “[t]he civilized nations of the world 
are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed 
as punishment for a crime.”39  This case marked the first time 
the Court looked outside our borders to determine what global 
society felt about certain punishments.  The plurality further 
noted that a United Nations (“UN”) survey “of the nationality 
laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries . 
. . impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.  In this 
country, the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.”40  The 
                                                          
32 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (recognizing that 
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”). 
33 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31, 830 n.31 (1988) 
(plurality opinion) (noting the abolition of the juvenile death penalty “by 
other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading 
members of the Western European community,” and observing that “[w]e 
have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international 
community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”). 
34 “It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world 
surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did 
not ensue.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005). 
35 Id. at 576. 
36 Id. at 575. 
37 “Yet at least from the time of the Court’s decision in Trop, the Court 
has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
“cruel and unusual punishments.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) 
(plurality opinion). 
38 Id. at 102. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 103. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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Trop plurality cited to nations that had banned citizenship 
revocation as a punishment.41  The link between international 
law and the Court’s holding, however, was unclear. 42  The Trop 
dissent never attacked the use of other countries’ laws in 
coming to a holding that denaturalization constituted a cruel 
and unusual punishment.  In fact, the dissent showed that the 
laws of certain countries allowed the punishment of 
denaturalization, meaning those governments could have 
thought it neither cruel nor unusual.43   
In 1988, Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun once again embraced a conception of “the ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society’ that had no express limits or ‘contours.’”44  Their 
plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, holding that a 
fifteen-year-old could not be executed for murder, once again 
compared the laws of various nations, including those of the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Spain, and 
Switzerland, among others.45 The opinion also cited 
international treaties, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human 
Rights, and the Geneva Convention.  It relegated much of the 
discussion of international and comparative law to a footnote.46  
Scalia scathingly dissented, “[t]he plurality’s reliance upon 
Amnesty International’s account of what it pronounces to be 
civilized standards of decency in other countries is totally 
inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental 
beliefs of this Nation.”47  Conservatives throughout the Court’s 
                                                          
41 Id. at 102–03. 
42 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Atkins, explicitly noted that “the Trop 
plurality—representing a view of only a minority of the Court—offered no 
explanation for its own citation.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 
(2002). 
43 Trop, 356 U.S. at 126 (Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
44 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion) 
(Stevens, J.) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)). 
45 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830–31 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.). 
46 Of course, footnotes are not items to be cast aside.  The famous 
Carolene footnote, after all, bore the doctrine of strict scrutiny. See Abner 
Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985). “All too often, 
yesterday’s obiter dictum become tomorrow’s law of the land.”  Id. at 649. 
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence have held this line.   
 
2. Roper v. Simmons48 and International Law 
 
Justice Scalia decried the use of international law in 
Stanford v. Kentucky, the 1989 decision upholding the 
constitutionality of capital punishment for minors.49  A 
majority signed onto his first footnote, which read, “[w]e 
emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are 
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their 
various amici that the sentencing practices of other countries 
are relevant.”50 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper v. 
Simmons, holding the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional, 
overturned Scalia’s Stanford v. Kentucky opinion.51  Kennedy 
wrote, “[o]ur determination that the death penalty is a 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds 
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the 
only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”52  Kennedy noted that 
such laws and international authorities had always been 
“instructive”53 to the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
even though the past opinions he cited for this proposition, 
however, never used the term.54  Perhaps most revealing is 
that the citations he used to support his proposition all 
referenced either pluralities or footnotes—never an in-text five-
Justice majority.55  Thus, Roper was groundbreaking in that 
the majority did not relegate international treaties, including 
the CRC,56 to a footnote.  Justice O’Connor, even in dissent, 
                                                          
48 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
49 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
50 Id. at 370 n.1. 
51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
52 Id. at 575. 
53 The word “instructive” is perhaps purposefully broad—it might mean 
either “serving to instruct” or simply “enlightening.” 
54 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–77. 
55  Justice O’Connor lists these references in a long string cite referring 
to the Trop plurality, an Atkins footnote, the Thompson plurality, a 
Thompson plurality footnote, an Enmund footnote, and, lastly, a Coker 
footnote.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
56 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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expressly revoked her prior accord with Scalia in Stanford,57 
disagreeing with his contention “that foreign and international 
law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”58  
For the first time, six Justices agreed that international law 
was at least relevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.   
Whereas Justice Scalia would like to see an end placed on 
the Supreme Court’s use of international law in most 
contexts,59 this article would ask that the Supreme Court only 
apply it consistently.  As Justice Scalia pointed out, for 
example, the United Kingdom banned the death penalty for 
both juveniles and adults, yet the majority cited to the UK ban 
to show how the country from which we derived our Eighth 
Amendment disallowed capital punishment of juveniles.60  
Such a distinction would only matter if we also banned the 
death penalty completely.61  Justice Scalia was also prescient in 
acknowledging that “in addition to barring the execution of 
under-18 offenders, the [CRC] prohibits [JLWOP].  If we are 
truly going to get in line with the international community, 
then the Court’s reassurance that the death penalty is really 
not needed, since ‘[JLWOP] is itself a severe sanction,’. . . gives 
little comfort.”62   
Still, given the “evolving standards of decency” framework 
used to determine the constitutionality of punishments,63 there 
is little need to place what it means to be decent in a 
particularly localized, i.e., Westernized, concept of human 
decency.64  As the Roper Court both acknowledged and 
                                                          
57 She dissented in spite of her acknowledgment of the relevance of 
international law because there was “no such domestic consensus . . . and the 
recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic 
fact.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 604. 
59 See Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the 
Federal Courts (2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 305 (2004). 
60 Cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (majority opinion) (“As of now, the [U.K.] 
has abolished the death penalty in its entirety.”).  
61 Cf. id. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. (citation omitted). 
63 A plurality of the Court in 1958 established this standard as the go-to, 
and it has been utilized ever since.  Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion). 
64 There is nothing particularly originalist about Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Many scholars disagree with the primacy placed upon the 
new “evolving” framework.  See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original 
11
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cautioned, “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution 
or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express 
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights 
within our own heritage of freedom.”65  Indeed, the Graham 
majority appeared to look to those precepts. 
The Graham majority stated that “the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against [JLWOP for non-
homicide offenses] provide[s] respected and significant 
confirmation for our conclusions [that the imposition of JLWOP 
was cruel and unusual].”66  However, the Court has still never 
asked why such confirmation from international sources is 
even necessary to make determinations regarding the Eighth 
Amendment of the American Constitution.  Certainly, its use of 
international opinion begs the question—what is the value of 
looking outside America for confirmation if such confirmation 
adds nothing to the opinion?  The answer must be, of course, 
that the Court must be using international law not only for 
mere confirmation, but also for persuasive power.  The Graham 
majority either misspoke when it said it looked to underlying 
rationales, or it misspoke when it said it did not use 
international law beyond its “confirmatory value.”67  
                                                                                                                                  
Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1825 (2008) (arguing “The Framers of the Bill of 
Rights understood the word ‘unusual’ to mean ‘contrary to long usage.’  
Recognition of the word’s original meaning will precisely invert the ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ test and ask the Court to compare challenged 
punishments with the longstanding principles and precedents of the common 
law, rather than shifting and nebulous notions of ‘societal consensus’ and 
contemporary ‘standards of decency.’”). 
65 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
66 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (majority opinion) 
(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).  Because the conservative Justice Alito 
replaced Justice O’Connor on the bench, only five in Graham continued to 
advocate for the inclusion of international law within the majority’s 
determination.  Although six justices voted to repeal the JLWOP sentence in 
Graham, Chief Justice Roberts did not agree it should be done in every 
instance.   Interestingly, and most certainly on purpose, Chief Justice Roberts 
never mentions the word “international” or another country’s name in his 
concurrence.  Id. at 2036–43 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Today, only three 
justices criticize the use of international law explicitly.  The criticism is, as 
Justice Thomas notes, “confine[d] to a footnote.”  Id. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
67 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.  A discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
honest use of international law I leave to other, more equipped scholars.  See, 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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Confirmatory value in this context is not merely an affirming 
tool.  The honesty problem remains.   
II. THE PROBLEM OF LOOKING TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the reasons why 
essentially all other nations have done away with JLWOP.  Up 
to and including Graham, aside from discussing the policy of 
Great Britain, the Court has discussed broad treaties and 
placed persuasive emphasis on the sheer number of nations 
opposing certain sentencing policies.68  It has not emphasized 
underlying rationales.  Because there is no evidence the Court 
will examine these rationales in the future, advocates ought to 
examine them themselves. 
A. The Graham Court and the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 
The Graham majority cited the CRC,69 ratified by all but 
the United States and Somalia,70 as part of its argument to end 
JLWOP in America.  Crucially, the Brief for Amnesty 
International cited to international law throughout, paying 
particular attention to the CRC.71  The relevant provision, 
Article 37(a), reads: “[n]o child shall be subjected to torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without 
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.”72  Thus, the Court’s 
honesty problem reveals itself once more—the relevant 
provision of the CRC clearly makes no exception for JLWOP 
when a juvenile offender has committed homicide.  Despite this 
                                                                                                                                  
e.g., Ernst A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 148 (2005) (discussing the Court’s use of foreign law to provide 
support for its reasoning in normative terms). 
68 For more on the idea of the power of “sheer numbers” in terms of 
international law and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Young, supra 
note 67. 
69 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
70 David Weissbrodt, Prospects for Ratification of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 209, 210 (2006).  
71 Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27. 
72 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), 
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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fact, Graham’s holding makes a distinction between juveniles 
who kill and juveniles who do not.   
The CRC also states that juvenile offenders are to be 
incarcerated for the minimum necessary time;73 though the 
Graham Court conveniently avoided any discussion of 
incarceration lengths for juveniles beyond the absolute of 
JLWOP, amici felt no need to press the issue upon the Court.74  
Thus, while reformers should continue to advocate for its 
ratification, the use of the CRC at the federal court level is 
disingenuous at best and potentially harmful to the cause of 
national juvenile justice reform due to its likelihood of closing 
off conservatives to the underlying policy debate regarding 
juvenile sentencing. 
Additionally, as a matter of pure constitutional law, the 
Supreme Court’s choice to examine the CRC arguably usurped 
the Senate’s authority to ratify international treaties75 because 
the United States has signed, but not ratified, the CRC and is 
therefore not bound by its provisions.76  Reformers should 
certainly push for ratification of the CRC, particularly to 
provide the federal government with the impetus to abide by its 
sensible provisions.  Ratifying the CRC would also help provide 
a national impetus for change at the state level.77  But 
ratification is a separate task from pre-ratification advocacy, 
which should and must be carried out in a forum apart from 
                                                          
73 Id. art. 37(b) (“No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty 
unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child 
shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of 
last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”). 
74 There is no mention of this provision anywhere in the brief.  See Brief 
for Amnesty International, supra note 27. 
75 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International 
Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 486, 492 (2002). 
76 Id. at 512–13.  Bradley writes, “courts properly will decline to apply 
international law to override the considered choices of the president and 
Senate in their ratification of treaties. In addition, because of concerns 
relating to both separation of powers and federalism, courts properly will 
decline to apply customary international law to override state criminal 
punishment, especially when (as is the case here) the political branches have 
expressly declined to do so by treaty.”  Id. 
77 Were the United States to ratify the CRC (without reservation), it 
would become the law of the land.  See Jeffrey Huffines, The Role of N.G.O.s 
in U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
641, 650 (1997). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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the Supreme Court.  By using a non-ratified document at the 
Court to ask for juvenile sentencing reform, advocates might be 
doing more harm than good.  To move the discussion forward, 
advocates ought to more strongly consider allying with 
conservatives to enact real juvenile policy reforms on the local 
and national stage.78 
B. Just How Progressive are Juvenile Sentences Elsewhere? 
Finally, looking to the CRC hides the amazing truth of 
what lies beneath its JLWOP standard: that many countries 
with juvenile-specific sentencing laws go well beyond what 
even the most progressive juvenile sentencing reform advocates 
in the United States seek to achieve.  The sentencing lengths 
below represent not what reformers should pursue, but only 
serve to demonstrate that a varied, yet large, number of 
countries all agree on one thing—dealing with juvenile 
offenders does not require the harsh sentencing that the 
United States feels is appropriate.   
 
 
                                                          
78 Perhaps the strongest ally is the Right on Crime movement. 
Advocating a reduction in unnecessary confinement, an increase in effective 
school discipline policies, reviews of juvenile sentences, and increased 
community-based programming, the Right on Crime movement makes a 
powerful ally.  See Priority Issues: Juvenile Justice, RIGHT ON CRIME, 
http://www.righton crime.com/priority-issues/juvenile-justice/ (last visited 
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79 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1992: Brazil,¶ 575, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.65 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
80 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1997: Ghana, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.34 (July 
14, 2005). 
81 Children Act of 1997, C. 59, § 94(7) (Uganda), available at 
http://www.ulii.org/ug/legis/consol_act/ca199786/ (Uganda’s three-year 
maximum is also dramatic in that it replaces an adult corollary punishment 
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Ecuador82 4 Sweden83 4 Switzerland84 4 
Mexico85 5 Bahrain86 6 Slovakia87 7 
Cape Verde88 8 Denmark89 8 Estonia90 8 
Honduras91 8 Iceland92 8 Mozambique93 8 
                                                          
82 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Fourth Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2007, Ecuador, ¶ 526, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ECU/4 (July 10, 
2009).   
83 See Juvenile Care for Teen Girlfriend Murder, THE LOCAL, Aug. 3, 
2010, available at http://www.thelocal.se/28158/20100803. 
84 Juvenile Criminal Law, SWISS PORTAL, http://www.ch.ch/private/00093/ 
00104/00514/00524/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).     
85 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2002: Addendum, Mexico, ¶ 304, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/125/Add.7 (Aug. 24, 2005). 
86 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report on the Implementation 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Bahrain, 29th Sess., Jan. 14, 
2002–Feb. 1, 2002, 37, (Oct. 1, 2001).  One juvenile had been sentenced to ten 
years for throwing a bomb at a policeman, but the sentence was later 
reduced.  Id. at 38.  In 2010, one lawyer reported that “the toughest 
punishment ever meted on a minor” was six years, after a court found a 
sixteen-year-old guilty of running over an older gentleman several times, 
killing him.   Suad Hamada, Rights-Bahrain: Law on Young Offenders Needs 
Fixing – Critics, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.global 
issues.org/ news/2010/08/25/6734. 
87 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1999, Slovakia, ¶ 319, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SVK/2 (Sept. 
21, 2006).  
88 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports Due in 1994, 
Cape Verde, ¶ 184, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.23 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
89 Denmark, now controlled by a right-wing parliament, kept its 
maximum sentence at eight years, the punishment that has been in place 
since 1930. See Britta Kyvsgaard, Youth Justice in Denmark, 31 CRIME & 
JUST. 349, 372 (2004). 
90 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Estonia, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.45 (July 11, 
2002). 
91 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2002, Honduras, ¶¶ 370–71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HND/3 
(July 27, 2006). 
92 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Iceland, ¶ 379, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.6, (Mar. 15, 
1995). 
93 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1996, Mozambique, ¶¶ 564–68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.11 (May 14, 
2001) (children under sixteen cannot be incarcerated for any reason).   
17
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Armenia94 10 Azerbaijan95 10 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina96 
10 
Burma97 10 Cameroon98 10 Chad99 10 
Croatia100 10 Czech 
Republic101 
10 Egypt102 10 
Eritrea103 10 Ethiopia104 10 Germany105 10 
                                                          
94 UNICEF, ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS IN 
ARMENIA 23 (2010). 
95 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1999, Azerbaijan, ¶ 452, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.13 
(Apr. 7, 2005). 
96 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 360, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.28 
(Oct. 14, 2004). 
97 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Myanmar, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.9 (Sept. 18, 
1995). 
98 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1995: Addendum, Cameroon, ¶ 226, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.16 (Mar. 
26, 2001). 
99 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1997, Chad, ¶ 271, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TCD/2 (Dec. 14, 
2007). 
100 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1998, Croatia, ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.23 (Nov. 
28, 2003). 
101 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1994: Addendum, Czech Republic, ¶ 245, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.11 
(June 17, 1996). 
102 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, Egypt, ¶ 194 (xi), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.9 
(Nov. 11, 1999). 
103 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1996: Addendum, Eritrea, ¶ 78(b), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.12 
(Dec. 23, 2002). 
104 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1993: Addendum, Ethiopia, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.27 
(Sept. 12, 1995). 
105 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
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Kyrgyzstan106 10 Latvia107 10 Lithuania108 10 
Macedonia109 10 Montenegro110 10 Oman111 10 
Serbia112 10 Slovenia113 10 Spain114 10 
Togo115 10 Tunisia116 10 Ukraine117 10 
United Arab 
Emirates118 
10 Bulgaria119 12 Finland120 12 
                                                          
106 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1996, Kyrgyzstan, ¶ 255, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.6 (Sept. 20, 
1999). 
107 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1994, Latvia, ¶ 231, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.22 (Mar. 22, 
2000). 
108 Penal Code, § 90(5) (2000) (Lith.) (even this punishment is only 
instituted for acts of terrorism committed by a juvenile). 
109 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ¶ 236, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.36 (June 27, 1997). 
110 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 2008, Montenegro, ¶ 324, U.N. CRC/C/125/Add.7 (Nov. 23, 
2008). 
111 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1999: Addendum, Oman, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/78/Add.1 
(July 18, 2000). 
112 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
due in 2003, Serbia, ¶ 452, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SRB/1 (Aug. 31, 2007). 
113 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1998, Slovenia, ¶ 269, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.19 
(June 18, 2003). 
114 See Cristina Rechea Alberola & Esther Fernández Molina, Continuity 
and Change in the Spanish Juvenile Justice System, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 342 (J. Junger-Tas & S.H. Decker eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]. 
115 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1992: Addendum, Togo, ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.42 (May 28, 
1996). 
116 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1999, Tunisia, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.1 (Oct. 30, 2001). 
117 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Ukraine, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.10/Rev.1 
(Jan. 18, 1995). 
118 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1999, United Arab Emirates, ¶ 108, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/78/Add.2 (Oct. 
24, 2001). 
119 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Bulgaria, ¶ 264, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.29 (Oct. 12, 
1995). 
120 E-mail from Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Dir., Nat’l Research Inst. of Legal 
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Jordan121 12 Kazakhstan122 12 Syria123 12 
Austria124 15 Costa Rica125 15 Georgia126 15 
Lebanon127 15 Lesotho128 15 Liechtenstein129 15 
Moldova130 15 Suriname131 15 Congo132 20 
                                                                                                                                  
Policy, Finland, to David A. Shapiro (Nov. 19, 2010, 4:53 AM) (on file with 
author).   
121 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Jordan, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.4 (Nov. 26, 
1993).  The adult corollary is the death penalty. Abolitionist and Retentionist 
Countries, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolition 
ist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
122 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1996: Addendum, Kazakhstan, ¶ 306, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.13 
(Sept. 24, 2002).  The adult corollary is the death penalty. Abolitionist and 
Retentionist Countries, supra note 121. 
123 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1995: Addendum, Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 250, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/28/Add.2 (Feb. 14, 1996).  The Syrian sentences are served with 
compulsory labor.  Id.  The adult corollary is the death penalty.  Id. 
124 Karin Bruckmüller, Austria: A Protection Model, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 287.  See also, U.N. Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, Austria, ¶ 
640, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.8 (July 8, 2004) (individuals between eighteen 
and twenty one receive a maximum of twenty years). 
125 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2002, Costa Rica, ¶ 601, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/125/Add.4 
(Oct. 13, 2004). 
126 Crim. Code § 88(2) (2000) (Geor.). 
127 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1993: Addendum, Lebanon, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.23 
(Feb. 3, 1995). 
128 Carina du Toit, A Measure of Last Resort? Child Offenders and Life 
Imprisonment, 17 S. AFR. CRIME Q. 13, 15 (Sept. 2006). 
129 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1998, Liechtenstein, ¶ 235, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.1 (Aug. 2, 
1999). 
130 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1995, Moldova, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.19 (May 3, 
2002). 
131 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1995: Addendum, Suriname, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.11 
(Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Suriname]. 
132 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1999, Congo, ¶ 432, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/COG/1 (Feb. 20, 2006). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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Djibouti133 20 France134 20 Hungary135 20 
Mali136 20 Morocco137 20 Norway138 20 
Romania139 20 Rwanda140 20 Senegal141 20 
South 
Korea142 
20 Tajikistan143 20 United States144 62 
 
As the charts above depict, at least forty countries, from 
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, abide by the 
principle that ten years is the maximum appropriate sentence 
                                                          
133 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1993, Djibouti, ¶ 141, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.39 (Aug. 3, 
1998). 
134 ORDONNANCE DU 2 FEVRIER 1945 RELATIVE À L’ENFANCE DELINQUANTE 
[ORDINANCE OF 2 FEBRUARY 1945 RELATIVE TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY], art. 33 
(Fr.). 
135 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Hungary, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.34 (Sept. 24, 
1996). 
136 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1997, Mali, ¶ 111, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MLI/2 (Apr. 11, 
2006). 
137 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1995: Addendum, Kingdom of Morocco, ¶ 310, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/28/Add.1 (Aug. 19, 1995). 
138 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1992: Addendum, Norway, ¶ 163, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.7 
(Oct. 12, 1993). 
139 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1999, Romania, ¶ 169, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.19 (July 5, 
2002). 
140 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1998, Rwanda, ¶ 92, U.N. Doc CRC/C/70/Add.22 (Oct. 8, 
2003). 
141 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1992: Addendum, Senegal, ¶ 199, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.31 (Oct. 17, 
1994). 
142 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1998, Republic of Korea, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.14 
(June 26, 2002). 
143 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2000, Tajikistan, ¶ 100, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TJK/2 (Apr. 2, 
2009). 
144 Assuming life imprisonment without parole as maximum punishment, 
based on current average life expectancy, for youth arrested at approximately 
fourteen years. Life Expectancy at Birth, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2102.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
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for juveniles.145  No fewer than five countries have maximums 
of twelve years.146 At least eight have fifteen-year 
maximums.147  A mix of at least twelve Asian, African, and 
both Eastern and Western European nations have maximum 
sentences of twenty years imprisonment.148  
Several countries apply simple rules to make sense of 
sentencing laws, typically in the form of fractional 
punishments.149  Chile, for instance, reduces the maximum 
possible sentence to the lowest applicable measure, and then 
reduces it even further.150  In six countries, the maximum 
juvenile sentence is half the maximum of an adult sentence.151  
In Russia, the maximum punishment of a juvenile is two-thirds 
the time of the potential adult sentence.152  In Suriname, where 
minors under the age of sixteen cannot be imprisoned for any 
reason, those between the ages of sixteen and eighteen can be 
                                                          




149 See infra p. 17–20. 
150 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1993: Addendum, Chile, ¶ 237, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.18 (June 22, 
1993). 
151 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1994, Albania, ¶ 480, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add. 27 (July 
5, 2004); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties, Andorra, ¶ 125, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.3 (July 3, 2001); UN Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: 
Addendum, Benin Corrigendum, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.52 (July 4, 
1997); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1997, Bhutan, ¶ 388, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/BTN/2 (July 16, 
2007); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1994: Addendum, Cambodia, ¶ 234, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.16 (June 
24, 1998). In Albania, the absolute maximum is twelve and a half years. 
UNICEF, ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS IN 
ALBANIA 21 (2009).  The same is true for those fourteen to sixteen in Guinea, 
while those sixteen to eighteen can only be sentenced to terms that allow for 
their rehabilitation. UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports 
Awaited from the States Parties For 1992: Addendum, Guinea, ¶ 108, 113, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.48 (June 17, 1997); Anne Wyvekens, The French 
Juvenile Justice System, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 
184. 
152 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, Russian Federation, ¶ 410, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/65/Add.5 (Nov. 20, 1998). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/4
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sentenced to one-third the equivalent adult penalty.153  These 
countries all recognize that there is something different about 
childhood.   
Globally, then, sentences are as progressive as they are 
diverse and there are no clear trends in the countries from 
which one can infer that the sentence caps were hastily passed 
into law, that they do not work, or that they are a product of a 
certain type of globalized thinking necessarily at odds with 
American values.  Countries have gone well beyond the calling 
of the CRC and they have done just enough to comply with it.  
They have enacted reforms at the United Nations’ urging and 
they have led the charge encouraging other countries to 
comply.   
From an American perspective, massing hundreds of 
nations into one conglomerate of those “more reformed than us” 
is ineffective in the long-term.  Each country has its own 
reasons for its specific juvenile justice system.  The sentencing 
schemes delineated above illuminate the various individual 
juvenile sentencing practices across the globe.  The juvenile 
justice reform community has overlooked these individual 
sentences, and the rationales behind them, for far too long.  
This article encourages advocates to think about these 
sentences and how they might be able to domesticate them in 
the fifty states. 
III. BRINGING INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE SENTENCING 
STANDARDS & REFORMS HOME 
Because some countries have reformed their juvenile 
sentencing laws based upon doctrine that does not resemble 
our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, America can learn from, 
but the Supreme Court cannot consider, the sentencing policies 
in these countries.  The United States’ arguably unique 
traditions and interest rooted in independence, responsibility, 
and its lack of primacy on protecting children (exemplified by 
the fact that its Constitution does not seek to provide for their 
education or protection), prevents major change on the national 
level in the arena of juvenile justice reform.  Reformers remain 
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in a position to advocate for change on the state and local 
levels.   
While scholars continue to include international law in 
amicus briefs to the Supreme Court,154 the better approach is to 
use the same evidence and analysis to convince state 
legislators to enact viable reform.  State legislatures enact the 
overwhelming majority of criminal laws.  The states are called 
“test tubes”155 because legislatures at the local level may be 
more willing to take risks and embrace new ideas.156  Finally, 
by shifting advocacy from the federal courts to the state 
legislatures, reforms will be implemented sooner and without 
the conservative backlash that comes with advocating “foreign” 
ideas in American courts. 
State governments, even as they have recently become 
more conservative, will be receptive to the ideas of juvenile 
justice reformers provided they are appropriately framed.  
Counties in Arizona and Florida have recently become part of 
the Juvenile Justice System Improvement Project, a program 
that will help localities institute effective policies to increase 
outcomes for court-involved youth.157  North Carolina is 
working to increase the age at which children can be 
automatically tried as adults.158  The Annie E. Casey Juvenile 
Detention Alternative Initiative is helping spread reform to 
counties of all sizes and political values.159 
Social theorists point out how policies and sentences of 
other countries can be made relevant in the United States.  
According to the social impact theory, in order for individuals 
to adopt and advocate for new ideas, they must have stable and 
consistent access to them.  Thus, as long as ideas espoused by 
                                                          
154 See, e.g., Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27. 
155 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
156 Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Address at the National Association of 
Counties Legislative Conference (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110307.html. 
157 Juvenile Justice System Information Project, CENTER FOR JUVENILE 
JUST. REFORM, http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/jjsip/jjsip.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2012). 
158 Shavonne Potts, NY Only Other State Treating 16-, 17-Year-Olds as 
Adults, SALISBURY POST (July 17, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.salisburypost. 
com/News/071711-juvenile-offender-sidebar-qcd. 
159 ROCHELLE STANFIELD, PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM: THE 
JDAI STORY (1999). 
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the global community are consistently highlighted by 
advocates, the more those ideas will be discussed and the more 
they will become normalized.160   
It stands to reason, therefore, that knowledge and 
discussion of foreign sentencing policies is helpful to 
formulating state sentencing laws.  As Justice Thomas worried 
in his Graham dissent, the majority’s decision to hold JLWOP 
unconstitutional constituted a “moral judgment” that had no 
place in federal court jurisprudence.161  These moral 
judgments, however, form the basis of how we all think.  Using 
the model of social impact theory, advocates can increase 
exposure to new ideas in order to help inform the moral 
judgments of state legislators—the people Justice Thomas 
would like to see make changes. 
The countries below have been selected for analysis 
because their models offer dichotomous approaches to those 
that exist in the United States and because there is something 
about the country that makes it an interesting (though not 
necessarily apt) comparator.  It is important to recognize that 
they are included not because they provide the “correct” ways 
of reforming juvenile justice, but because they provide unique 
perspectives on the issue. 
A. Country Models for Reform162: South Africa 
South Africa’s model of juvenile justice reform is one of a 
conflux of international law, public policy expertise, and 
democratic and local values coming together to form a more 
reformed, progressive juvenile justice system.  Crucially, South 
Africa has been perhaps the greatest success story for juvenile 
reform through an almost complete reconstructing of its 
                                                          
160 “To the extent that individuals are relatively uninvolved in an issue, 
they should be influenced by the strength, immediacy, and number of people 
advocating a contrary position.”  Andrzej Nowak et. al., From Private Attitude 
to Public Opinion: A Dynamic Theory of Social Impact, 97 PSYCHOL. REV. 362, 
364 (1990). 
161 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
162 I chose several countries’ juvenile justice systems for evaluation.  The 
choices were relatively random—I simply attempted to pick countries that 
either had a strong connection to America, either culturally, socially, or 
historically, or those with a plethora of research available.   
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governing system following Apartheid, during which it created 
a strong, progressive Constitution.163   
As recently as 1999, South Africa had four children serving 
LWOP.164  In 1995, however, South Africa ratified the CRC.  
International law is binding upon South Africa, but it still 
enacted a new law to eliminate JLWOP, amongst other 
reforms.165  The CRC and the principles of restorative justice 
were the joint impetus behind the new law.166  The protections 
for juveniles in South Africa also centered on “the indigenous 
concept of Ubuntu,167 thus Africanizing the international 
principles by emphasizing family and community.”168  
Certainly, this makes the juvenile justice reformer’s task more 
difficult.  Advocating for reduced sentencing in America to be 
more like South Africa’s, or the sentencing of any country 
where its constitution was similarly established, ignores the 
                                                          
163 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 
261 (2001) (calling South Africa’s Constitution: “[t]he most admirable 
constitution in the history of the world” and “the world’s leading example of a 
transformative constitution.”).  
164 Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to 
Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 999 (2008) 
(citing U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, South Africa, ¶ 514, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/51/Add.2 (May 22, 1998)).  A law instituted in 1998, however, ensured 
the opportunity for a parole hearing after one had served twenty-five years of 
his or her life sentence. ANN SKELTON & BOYANE TSHEHLA, INSTITUTE FOR 
SECURITY STUDIES, CHILD JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 18 (2008) (citing the 
Correctional Service Act 111 of 1998 (S. Afr.)). 
165 John D. Van der Vyver, International Standards for the Promotion 
and Protection of Children’s Rights: American and South African Dimensions, 
15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 106 (2009); Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Benyam D. 
Mezmur, 2 + 2 = 5? Exploring the Domestication of the CRC in South African 
Jurisprudence (2002-2006), 16 INT’L J CHILDREN’S RTS. 1, 3 n.3 (2008). 
166 SKELTON & TSHEHLA, supra note 164; see also Child Justice Act of 
2008 (S. Afr.).  
167 Ubuntu is “a frame of mind prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
relates to a specific communal approach to the notion of people.” Stefan 
Schulz & Marthinus Hamutenya, Juvenile Justice in Namibia: Law Reform 
Towards Reconciliation and Restorative Justice? 1 (Polytech of Nambia, 
Paper, 2004). “Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language.  It 
speaks of the very essence of being human.”  Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
explains Ubuntu is linked to forgiveness, and a system of shared values that 
enables survival and increases the humanity of all.  Ann Skelton, Restorative 
Justice as a Framework for Juvenile Justice Reform, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 
496, 499 (2002). 
168 S. AFR. L. COMM’N, PROJECT 106: JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 8 (2000).  
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fundamental differences between our society and theirs, which 
must be addressed before we can pursue real change.   
Still, that some South African values are not American 
should not mean that they are the wrong values or that 
America cannot adopt these values for its own.  South Africa 
provides a clear model of a country that can create its own 
juvenile legislation in accordance with both domestic and 
international law.  It is also special in that the creation of its 
current juvenile legislation was done in an open manner, 
embracing criticism and suggestions from laypeople, lawyers, 
scholars, and even children.169  Ironically, the Commission that 
helped craft the legislation expressly repudiated placing a 
maximum on juvenile sentencing.170  In fact, the South African 
drafters were “concerned that this might lead to effective 
multiplicity of charges in order to ensure the possibility of 
lengthy sentences (e.g., several fifteen-year terms) being 
imposed.”171  Relying on Ubuntu and international law, 
therefore, the drafters “opted not to set a maximum term of 
imprisonment, and trust[ed] that the fact of youthful age 
[would] play a large role in mitigating excessively long 
sentences for children.”172  Though Ubuntu might not be easily 
Westernized, advocates can still press for juvenile sentencing 
maximums and more holistic treatment options at the state 
level.  Reformers can also look to the method by which South 
Africa passed its legislation, instituting similar committees in 
the United States. 
B. Increasing Rehabilitative Reform Efforts: Argentina, Greece 
& Finland 
Reformers can also use international juvenile sentencing 
norms to advocate for an increased emphasis on rehabilitation 
in the United States.  Argentina’s highest court looked to 
several factors in prohibiting JLWOP, including various UN 
treaties, the CRC, and even In re Gault,173 the United States 
Supreme Court case that recognized the due process rights of 
                                                          
169 Id. at 166. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 168.  
172 Id. at 168–69. 
173 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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minors.174  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina 
held, “the decision of the [lower chamber sentencing the 
juvenile to life imprisonment without parole for at least 
twenty-five years] does not exhibit any understanding why a 
penalty of [fourteen] years in prison for a crime committed at 
age [sixteen] was insufficient.”175  The insufficiency probably 
lay in the instinct and desire to enact vengeance.  Reformers 
ought to press this notion by digging deeper into sentencing 
law and asking what rehabilitation—not vengeance—requires.  
This tactic might be difficult to use at the state level.  It 
requires an honest examination of America’s willingness to 
punish for retribution over all other reasons, asking legislators 
to re-evaluate how they conceive of punishment. 
Greece was also concerned with the rehabilitation/ 
retribution balance.  The CRC had little impact in Greece prior 
to 2010, as the nation had always complied with the Article 37 
mandate.176  Still, in 2002, the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child asked Greece to abolish provisions allowing for a 
child to be imprisoned for a period of twenty years.177  Greece 
responded in 2010, passing legislation to change the maximum 
sentence to fifteen years.178  Greece reformed its sentencing for 
many reasons, one of which was a worry that a longer sentence 
                                                          
174 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, [CSJN][National Supreme 
Court of Justice], 7/12/2005, “Maldonado, Daniel Enrique/Senetencia” (Arg.). 
175 Id. It is unclear whether the Maldonado decision applies retroactively.  
As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reported, while Maldonado 
was significant, “of the 12 life sentences of children passed since 1997 to 
2002, three still face[d] life imprisonment . . . [and] that their cases have been 
brought to the attention of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Argentina, May 25, 2010–June 11, 2010, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ARG/CO/3–4, 
54th Sess., (June 21, 2010). “While welcoming the fact that no more life 
sentences have been passed since 2002, the Committee urges the State party 
to refrain from sentencing children to life imprisonment or sentences that 
may amount to life imprisonment.” Id. at ¶ 39. 
176 Angelika Pitsela, Greece: Criminal Responsibility of Minors in the 
National and International Legal Orders, 75 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 356, 377 
(2004). 
177 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Greece, ¶ 78(h), U.N. Doc. CRC/ 
C/15/Add.170; 29th Sess., (Apr. 2, 2002). 
178 E-mail from Professor Calliope Spinellis to David A. Shapiro, (Sep. 29, 
2010, 3:51 AM) (on file with author) (translating Article 54 of the Greek 
Penal Code as amended by Article 1 Act 3860/2010). 
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment.179  The other 
reasons included “the absence of [effective] rehabilitation 
programs” in juvenile facilities.180  This implies, ironically, that 
Greece decreased sentences because there was not enough of an 
emphasis on rehabilitation.  American legislators ought to 
follow suit.  To reach both liberal and conservative legislatures, 
the argument is this: we can tie sentencing norms to the 
availability of best practices models that assure all that is 
possible has been done to protect juveniles and to dissuade 
them from committing crimes.  Reducing crimes reduces costs.  
Sentencing reforms, thus, can be part of a national juvenile 
justice overhaul, conducted state-by-state. 
In Finland, where the maximum adult sentences are also 
quite low, its less punitive juvenile sentencing regime is also 
based on an overall emphasis on rehabilitation rather than on 
a conception of cruel and unusual punishment.181  Indeed, the 
“[sentencing] reform movement was inspired by the belief that 
crime was predominantly a social problem that could be 
counteracted by social reform, rather than repression.”182  In 
Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court expressly held that 
“[a] sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”183  If 
reform toward rehabilitation were to become the norm, 
pursuing such change at the federal court level could prove ill-
advised because the Supreme Court has never required a 
singular justification for punishment.  Still, to obtain the 
overwhelmingly successful results Finland has seen, states 
would need to embrace a more welfare-oriented ideology, at 
                                                          
179 E-mail from Professor Calliope Spinellis, to David A. Shapiro (Nov. 
17, 2010, 4:33 AM) (on file with author). 
180 Id. 
181 E-mail from Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Dir., Nat’l Research Inst. of Legal 
Policy, Finland, to David A. Shaprio (Nov. 22, 2010, 4:33 AM) (on file with 
author). 
182 See Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Finland: A Model of Tolerance?, in CRITICAL 
ISSUES, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
183 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in the judgment at 31–32); cf. Vincent G. Lévy, Note, Enforcing 
International Norms in the United States after Roper v. Simmons: The Case of 
Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 262, 290 (2007) (providing no citation for the proposition that 
“[n]evertheless, the Constitution arguably could require U.S. jurisdictions to 
emphasize rehabilitation,” clearly in conflict with Ewing). 
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odds with the emphasis on individuality and due process 
protections that defines the American justice system.  Success 
would not become a left versus right battle, but one of 
prioritization—would the American electorate be more 
comfortable, if forced to choose, with a model more steeped in 
expertise, or rights protection?   
C. Bringing our Own Norms Back Home: Afghanistan & Japan 
In evaluating American concepts of evolving dignity, 
reformers should look to the nations that America helped to 
create and the juvenile justice systems within fledging nations 
in which we have commanded a strong presence.  Many 
countries with some of the most progressive sentencing regimes 
can be found in Africa and Eastern Europe, where developing 
countries have modeled their democracies and governing 
structures on our own.184  Outside of a basis in the CRC, or 
customary jus cogens norms, these countries have reformed 
their juvenile sentencing policies because of American values 
and our own history of juvenile legislation.  Developing nations 
and those coming out of dictatorial rule look to Western 
guidelines to develop sound rules of law and governance.  
These same countries are on the forefront of progressive 
juvenile sentencing.  If these nations are going off what they 
most admire in the United States, is it not time to reevaluate 
our own principles, particularly as they relate to what makes 
sense in terms of juvenile sentencing in the twenty-first 
century?  It must be possible to justify banning JLWOP within 
a domestic context, after all, if other nations were able to look 
to our own to justify doing away with JLWOP.  Again, as its 
rhetoric demonstrates, the Supreme Court is too timid to face 
this truth, and such an argument should play out not only at 
the Court, but locally. 
In 2005, after the ratification of its new United States-
inspired Constitution, Afghanistan enacted a Juvenile Code, 
affirming that “the best interests of the child should be taken 
into consideration.”185  Significantly, the Code banned life 
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Due in 1996, Afghanistan, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AFG/1 (June 13, 2010). 
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imprisonment and the death penalty for minors.186  
Afghanistan continues to build its new government with 
America’s help.  Indeed, Afghanistan’s laws allow for capital 
punishment,187 yet its juvenile sentences are more progressive.  
This is an emotive argument—one that can be made to states.  
Do we really want to be behind the countries we help to build?  
To conservatives, advocates can argue that we maintain 
American exceptionalism by being true to our values—that is, 
those we have exported abroad. 
Japan’s original juvenile legislation was also passed almost 
entirely due to American influence: “to bring the juvenile 
justice system into line with the post-war democratic 
constitution.”188  Aware that the American system “focused on 
what was best for the juvenile—and thus society—in the long-
term,”189 Japan sought to emulate what was most effective 
about the American legal system.190  It makes sense that the 
Japanese adopted a rather progressive juvenile sentencing 
regime.  Indeed, while scholars compare domestic sentencing to 
sentencing regimes of foreign lands, Japan serves as a crucial 
comparator because its media culture resembles our own.191  
There, as here, media portrayals of youth violence play a large 
role, contributing to America’s desire to institute harsh, 
punitive sentences at the expense of more progressive, 
restorative, and rehabilitative practices.192  Indeed, in response 
to several highly publicized, horrific incidents committed by 
juveniles, Japan revised its Juvenile Act in 2000; it had not 
done so “since the Allied Occupation in 1949.”193 While 
juveniles would receive a maximum sentence of fifteen years 
                                                          
186 Id. ¶ 82. For children sixteen to eighteen, it allows for only half the 
equivalent adult sentence. Id. For children twelve to sixteen, it allows only up 
to a third of the equivalent adult sentence. Id. 
187 Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 121.  
188 Trevor Ryan, Creating ‘Problem Kids’: Juvenile Crime in Japan and 
Revisions to the Juvenile Act, 10 J. JAPAN L., 153, 155 (2005). 
189 Id. 
190 Mark Fenwick, Japan: From Child Protection to Penal Populism, in 
CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 3, at 147. 
191 See Japanese Juvenile Justice, BBC WORLD SERVICE (Feb. 24, 2001), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/010223_japan.shtml. 
192 See Ryan, supra note 188 at 176–78. 
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for an act punishable by life imprisonment if committed by an 
adult, Japan still allows life imprisonment for minors who have 
committed capital crimes.194 In 2005, its Supreme Court 
authorized the sentence of life imprisonment with labor for a 
juvenile who had committed homicide.195  Reformers can learn 
two things from Japan: first, how to respond to media, and 
second, how to push for quick reforms.  
D. Learning from the Research: The UK & Western Europe 
Not only does Great Britain provide an example of a 
country with penal legislation and values extremely similar to 
our own, but it also highlights the value that can be found in 
effective data collection to promote juvenile justice reform.  
Great Britain has effectively prohibited the punishment of 
JLWOP “for the better part of the past seventy-five years.  The 
prohibition emerged historically in recognition of the inherent 
instability and emotionally imbalance of persons under age 
[eighteen], which made such sentences cruel and unusual.”196  
Many of the countries with the harshest juvenile sentencing 
laws only have them because such “legislation . . . [drew] 
heavily from the U.K. Children’s Act of 1908, long since 
abandoned by the British, which was based on the outdated 
notion of rounding up and containing all delinquent and 
‘incorrigible’ children.”197  Research shows that “[t]his approach 
has been proven to be both costly and ineffective; in most 
                                                          
194 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2001, Japan, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/104/Add.2 (July 24, 
2003) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Japan]. 
195 Tomoki Ikenaga, The Phenomenon in the United States Juvenile 
Justice System of Blending Protective Sentencing and Criminal Sentencing, 
and the Issue of Stiffer Penalties in the Japanese Justice System, 1–2 (Ctr. for 
the Study of Law & Soc., Berkeley, Working Paper, May 27, 2005). “However, 
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be life imprisonment or limited-term imprisonment.” U.N. Comm. on the 
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sentence.  UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of 
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2009). 
196 Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27. 
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commonwealth countries, it has been supplanted by more child-
centered, rights-based approaches focused on restorative 
justice and community-based rehabilitation.”198  While 
England’s approach remains “more repressive than that of 
most other European countries,”199 crucially, “it seems more 
pragmatic than that of the United States.”200  Pragmatism is 
what is called for.  Indeed, we have a “tradition”201 of “strong 
empirical research,”202 yet we refuse to build upon it.203  
Instead, Western Europe has used our research time and time 
again to build programs that comply with international norms, 
reduce recidivism, minimize juvenile crime, respect 
individualism, and increase educational opportunity.204  
England has invested heavily in “generalized preventive 
policies”205 and a “gradual approach to youth crime”206 rather 
than bending to American all-or-nothing conceptions of three-
strikes policies and a “do the crime-pay the time mindset” that 
fails the test of logic when applied to juveniles.207 
Finally, in Belgium, only recently was the maximum 
sentence lowered to thirty years from life imprisonment.208  The 
change had little to do with the CRC.209  The Belgian system is 
                                                          
198 Id. 
199 Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What 
Conclusions Can Be Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 114, 
at 513.  
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202 Id. at 527.   
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welfare-oriented.210  While more criminal justice elements are 
being added to juvenile legislation, the fact that Belgium 
recently changed its maximum sentence reveals that 
retributivism—an increasingly punitive practice—can co-exist 
beside a juvenile welfare-oriented legal system.  Thus, 
reformers can use models present in Belgium to advocate for 
the welfare-oriented models found in Scandinavian countries, 
resolving the problem of rehabilitation versus retribution.  
Reformers should concentrate on domestic reform using 
various international principles so that our standard of decency 
will evolve, placing real reform on much more stable ground 
than tenuous 5–4 Supreme Court decisions.211   
We can reform juvenile practices while acknowledging that 
some of the ideas behind reforms in other countries appear not 
to mesh with our cultural norms.  The United States does not 
have Ubuntu, nor can we ask our citizens to suddenly adopt a 
concept that has been thriving in Africa.  Scholars can use the 
values of education and rehabilitation, however, to build a 
model that enables children to become more independent.   
Reformers might want to push for an elimination of the 
transfer procedures that allow youth to be tried in adult courts, 
for example.  What is perhaps most troubling about the use of 
the juvenile transfer is that it is based entirely on retributive 
ideology and has little to do with the American value of 
individualized judgment.  The model exists to prosecute the 
“worst” juvenile offenders, judging children as adults by 
looking first at the horrific nature of their crime and only 
second (if ever) to the reduced culpability that comes from 
youth.  Even in jurisdictions that claim to look at the offender 
holistically before conducting a transfer, this statement is 
accurate.  Transfer would not even be contemplated for 
relatively minor crimes, even if the juvenile were completely 
aware of the nature of the crime and its consequences.  Thus, 
there needs to be an acknowledgment at the most basic level 
that our justice system at the juvenile level is still based in a 
concept of vengeance, rather than rehabilitation.  If America 
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211 Although Graham was a 6–3, Judge Roberts’ concurrence stipulated 
that he would not ban LJWOP for non-homicide offenders as a general rule.  
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truly values independence and freedom, it must do away with 
juvenile transfers, just as many other nations have.  The 
average maximum juvenile sentence internationally, across all 
continents, is roughly fifteen years.212  Clearly, America needs 
real change.  These issues become meaningless if juvenile 
justice reformers at the state and national levels can 
successfully advocate for juvenile sentencing reforms using the 
examples provided by the various countries discussed in this 
article.   
We have already made progress.  Roper and Graham have 
led the discussion at the national level.  At the state and local 
levels, as the so-called “‘superpredator myth’ of the early 1990s 
that derailed”213 progress comes to a head, America is also 
moving in a less punitive direction.  The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative214 and 
Models for Change programs make headway,215 as does “the 
rise in litigation against juvenile corrections and fiscal 
pressures.”216  The Obama Administration has also recently 
announced “Race to the Top” grants to encourage states to 
think outside the box on juvenile justice reform issues.217  
These discretionary grants go to the states that develop the 
most innovative, groundbreaking methods for increasing 
outcomes for juvenile offenders and reducing recidivism.  
Advocates can use this incentive to push state legislatures to 
look not only to competitor states, but to other countries, with 
whom they do not have to compete for the block funding.  As 
juvenile reformers continue to move forward on these bases, I 
urge them not to forget all they can learn from the 
international arena.   
                                                          
212 See supra pp. 17–19. 
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E. Starting Points Inspired by Comparing other Nations 
This article has emphasized the importance of focusing on 
comparative, rather than international, law and using the 
models found in other nations to advocate at the local levels for 
change rather than the nation’s highest court.  It might be best 
to return to a more welfare-oriented system, premised in the 
notion of expertise that justifies the existence of administrative 
adjudicatory bodies.  In France, for example, the most violent 
juvenile offenders are tried by a three-judge panel of two youth 
court judges and a regular chief magistrate.218  Of course, the 
primacy placed on due process must be balanced with the need 
for a welfare-oriented model.  This system is easier to advocate 
on paper than in practice.  The transition can begin with a 
decreased emphasis on the retributive model of punishment.219  
Even where retribution is emphasized, however, as in 
Scandinavia and Scotland,220 the principle of “just desserts” 
remains prominent, but balanced, by “welfare boards, their 
restraint in punishment and institutionalization and their 
emphasis on treatment interventions.”221  
A changed emphasis might also rest in education.  The 
Council of Europe’s 1987 recommendation for juvenile justice 
argued that all sentences for juveniles ought to have “an 
educational character.”222  In America, the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges similarly argued that 
“[c]hildren are developmentally different from adults; they are 
developing emotionally and cognitively; they are 
impressionable; and they have different levels of 
understanding than adults.”223  The key difference is not just 
the phrase “educational,” but the very idea that the European 
system emphasizes an alternative to incarceration, not simply 
what separates adolescents from adults in terms of culpability 
and cognition, as the standard made by the American judiciary 
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elucidates. 
Jeffrey Fagan proposes having “states . . . recognize the 
constitutional fact of diminished culpability of adolescents by 
applying a ‘youth discount’ on sentences for juveniles who are 
sentenced as adults.”224  This idea can be borrowed directly 
from other countries225 and would certainly be a good start.  As 
Fagan continues, such a standard would reduce “the guesswork 
in parole decision-making and [would infuse] the virtue of 
even-handedness into the jurisprudence of juvenile crime.”226    
Given America’s early 1990s media coverage that focused 
on juvenile crime, reformers should seek to take control of the 
media message.  This could prove as important as, or even 
more important than, sentencing reform.227  “Media images”228 
have forced the hand of domestic politicians.  “Penal populism 
may emerge as the outcome of such media and political 
pressures.”229  Understanding the power of media images is 
crucial to reform efforts.230     
Overall, as Josine Junger-Tas argues, it would be best for 
America “to merge the evidence-based approach of the Anglo-
Saxon states with the essentially humanistic juvenile justice 
tradition of continental Europe”231 into a due process 
framework, deemphasizing retribution for juveniles and, at the 
same time, prioritizing education.  While that sounds like a lot 
to swallow, these types of changes should not be hard to 
institute.  America started the evidence-based model.232  It was 
the first country to proffer a humanist model to deal with 
juvenile justice.233  Our Constitution emphasizes, moreover, 
due process proudly as a model for all others.  In the end, the 
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call for reform by looking abroad is a Conservative one.  It asks 
us to harken back to our own traditions and history—and this 
is something that reformers of all political stripes can declare 
allegiance to.  
CONCLUSION 
Even if the United States finally enacts a total ban on 
JLWOP, life imprisonment remains a viable option.  In Florida, 
for example, where Terrance Graham was originally sentenced 
to LWOP, the courts “are re-sentencing . . . juveniles to new 
terms that still amount to life sentences.”234  This kind of 
sentencing, unfortunately, shows that the optimism held by 
juvenile justice reformers for Supreme Court decisions is 
misguided.   
This article has introduced a new paradigm, moving 
beyond potential upcoming cases in the Supreme Court—which 
will probably ask what “a meaningful opportunity of release”235 
consists of or whether JLWOP is unconstitutional when applied 
to juveniles who have committed felony murder236 and 
homicide,237 and noting that basing the validity of JLWOP 
upon international law will neither persuade decision-makers 
nor lead to any real change.238  Instead, by analyzing 
comparative rationales for progressive juvenile sentencing 
norms, this article demonstrates that scholars can make the 
most compelling case possible for real reform.   
America used to be the inspiration for countries pursuing 
juvenile justice reform.  It stood for fairness and compassion.  
It no longer does.  By looking at other countries, however, the 
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United States can not only recapture the American values that 
once led the juvenile justice movement across the globe, but 
help these values reinvigorate our own conceptions of what it 
means to be fair and just.  Even though the majority of western 
nations increased their emphasis on punishment over 
rehabilitation during the 1980s and 1990s,239 juvenile 
sentencing structures remained largely intact.   Reformers 
need to take Graham further.  Such steps start by going well 
beyond the Eighth Amendment context and actually evaluating 
what other countries do.  Foreign approaches may not always 
be better, but they provide a fresh perspective—one that is 
much needed given the current state of America’s juvenile 
justice system.  Advocates have been right to look abroad.  
They should dig deeper for rationales that can help to create 
substantive change here.  They should no longer rely upon the 
Supreme Court to achieve results.  We can do it.  Justice 
Ginsburg said it best: we should never “abandon the effort to 
learn what we can from the experience and good thinking 
foreign sources may convey.”240 
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